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More than a year ago, the Ifo Institute attributed
the weakness of the euro to the flight from the old
euro area currencies in terms of D-marks returning
from eastern Europe and other parts of the world
and black monies from within the euro area coun-
tries.1 While the empirical evidence of this effect
was anecdotal initially, it has improved significant-
ly over the last year. The most striking evidence is
the truly dramatic decline in the stock of euro area
currencies in circulation which took place in recent
months. This decline reflects the increasing pres-
sure which has been exerted on the euro.This note
reports on this evidence.
The theoretical explanation and some empirical
basis of the negative effect on the euro resulting
from the reduced currency demand were presented
in a formal working paper from early 2001 and an
article in this journal (Sinn and Westermann 2001a,
2001b). According to the theoretical explanation,
the reduction in demand for the old euro curren-
cies reduced the value of the euro and induced the
ECB, which pursued an interest target policy, to
buy back the outstanding currencies against short-
term securities which were mostly part of the
broader money aggregate M3. By changing the
composition of M3, given its size, the ECB pre-
vented the interest rate from falling further than it
did, but it was unable to fully avoid a fall in the
external value of the euro.
After all, as M3 was not affect-
ed, the ECB was unable to
counter the exchange rate
effect which necessarily result-
ed from a desired private port-
folio shift from short-term
European to short-term foreign
assets.A reduction in M3 could
have been brought about by
sterilised interventions in
favour of the euro. Such inter-
ventions occurred, but they
were too small to be visible in the data.If anything,
the time path of M3 became steeper in the relevant
period (Fig. 1).
From a theoretical perspective, the exchange rate
effect resulting from the flight from euro curren-
cies was itself similar to that resulting from a ster-
ilised intervention in the exchange market.
Empirical findings by Evans and Lyons (1999,
2001) on the exchange-rate effects of sterilised
interventions suggest that a one billion portfolio
shift from euro currency to dollar currency can
explain a long-term depreciation of the euro
against the dollar of about 0.4–0.5 cents in the
short term and 0.3–0.4 cents permanently.
Assessing the magnitude of the relevant exchange-
rate effects requires estimating the magnitude of
the reduction in the stock of currency in circula-
tion. This is a difficult task, since statistics on the
currency circulating abroad and, of course, on the
stocks of black money are not available.This is the
kind of indirect evidence which has been available
thus far:
(1) Explaining German money demand from 1966
through 2000 with the usual ingredients (interest
rate, GDP, time), Sinn and Westermann (2001a)
calculated a trend for money demand and showed
that, by the end of the year 2000, the actual cur-
rency in circulation had fallen below this trend by
more than two standard deviations or EUR 27 bil-
lion. Assuming that the observable decline in the
share of D-marks in the total stock of euro curren-
cies resulted from currency returning from abroad
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of black D-mark currency,
which would similarly occur in
other countries,the authors cal-
culated a total reduction of
euro area currency in circula-
tion against the trend of
EUR 48 billion in the period
from 1997 to 2000.
(2) According to a broad sur-
vey by the Austrian National
Bank in five east European
countries (Stix 2001), the
absolute decline of D-mark
currency from the second half
of 1998 until the first six
months of 2001 can be fully
explained by the decline in D-mark currency held
abroad.
(3) According to the same study, in May 2001 most
holders of D-mark currency in eastern Europe were
still undecided whether or not to convert this cur-
rency to euros. Of those who had decided, 41% said
they did not want to convert their D-mark currency
to euros but to other currencies. Sinn and
Westermann (2001b) inferred that the survey would
imply that a sum of EUR 14 billion would be
returned in the remaining months of the year 2001.
(4) The ECB declared in its November Bulletin
(p. 12) that 0.75 percentage points of the annual
increase in M3 had consisted of additional short-
term securities which were being accumulated out-
side the euro area countries. In absolute terms this
is a sum of about EUR 40 billion.The ECB there-
fore decided to redefine its broad money aggregate
M3 so as to exclude from this aggregate short-term
securities with a maturity of up to 2 years which
are held by non-residents. Recalculating the differ-
ence between the old and new definitions of M3,
the Ifo Institute estimates that, from January 1999
to September 2001,non-residents of euro countries
had accumulated short-term securities of the
described category in the order of EUR 100 bil-
lion. It seems likely that a substantial part of this
sum is the counterpart of the currency which
returned from abroad and was exchanged for
short-term securities by the ECB so as to prevent
an interest decline.
The evidence helps solve the puzzle of how large
the reduction in the demand for euros has been in
recent years, but even more striking evidence
results from the data contained in the following
figures. The deviations from the growth trend of
currency in circulation is so large that not sophisti-
cated econometric techniques are needed to see
what is going on.
Figure 2 shows the time path of overall currency in
circulation of the euro area countries calculated on
the basis of the official final exchange rates. It is
obvious that a deviation from the general trend
begins in 1997 and becomes truly dramatic in 2001,
showing an accelerated flight from the old curren-
cies. No end of this development was in sight in
October, the last month for which data were avail-
able. “Eyeball econometrics” shows that the over-
all downward deviation from the trend may easily
have been in the order of EUR 90 billion. Using
the results of Evans and Lyons as cited above, this
explains up to US$ 0.36 cents of the actual decline
of the euro (or D-mark, respectively) since 1997.
The effects shown in Figure 1 result from passive
interventions of the ECB, changing the composi-
tion of M3, given its size, in order to defend the
declared interest targets. If the ECB had not inter-
vened passively, there would have been a sharp
interest rate decline, and the decline in the euro
would have been stronger, but it would have been
impossible to see the decline in the demand for
euro currencies in the money data. The stock of
currency in circulation would have remained unaf-
fected. The decline in the actual stock of currency
in circulation is not the cause of the decline in the
exchange value of the euro, but an implication of
the decline in the demand for this currency result-
ing from a policy reaction by which the short-term
Figure 2interest rate was stabilised and the fall in the euro
was mitigated. However, it is a clear sign of the
magnitude of the original demand decline and the
forces that must have put pressure on the euro.
The decline in the currency in circulation was a
rather general phenomenon, applying to nearly all
euro area countries. Figures 3–8 (p. 47) show the
evidence for Germany, France, Italy,Austria, Spain
and the Netherlands. Everywhere we see a sharp
decline of the currency in circulation during the
year 2001.
In Germany, however, the decline was much
stronger than in other countries and it began earli-
er. Obviously, this country alone explains a decline
of the currency in circulation from the trend of
about 60 billion euros which amounts to two thirds
of the overall decline in the currency in circulation
of all euro area countries, although Germany has
only 34% of the total GDP.This aspect can certain-
ly be attributed to the fact that the large stocks of
D-marks that used to circulate abroad – one third
of the total German stock according to
Bundesbank estimates – have been returning from
there.Among the euro currencies,only the D-mark
classified as a significant international transactions
currency.
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Legend: Currency in circulation, monthly changes, accumulated (initial value zero), million EUR.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2001), Databank, on demand.